

New Lessons from the Cuban Missile Crisis

An Online Professional Development Seminar



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from the National Humanities Center

- Are there any analogies between the Cuban missile crisis and situations we face today, like the presence of nuclear weapons in North Korea or the possible presence of them in Iran?
- Did the crisis contribute to the assassination of JFK?
- What is the relevance of the Cuban missile crisis lessons today?

- What did U.S. policy makers perceive as the Soviet motives for placing ballistic missiles in Cuba? What actions by the Soviet Union led U.S. analysts to their conclusions about the Soviet motives?
- In fact, what were the Soviet motives? What actions by the United States led Soviet policy makers to respond by placing ballistic missiles in Cuba?
- On what basis do historians now believe the missile crisis was the closest the United States ever came to engaging in a nuclear war? What critical information do we know now that President Kennedy and his advisers did not know in 1962?
- In what way did flexibility and empathy on the part of both President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev, and direct communication between them, contribute to the resolution of the crisis without conflict?
- How relevant for understanding the crisis is the Cuban timeline – from April 17, 1961 to November 20, 1962 – in contrast to the traditional timeline of 13 days?



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

US policy toward Latin America, history of US foreign relations, policy making process

Sad and Luminous Days: Cuba's Struggle with the Superpowers after the Missile Crisis (2002)

A Contemporary Cuba Reader (2007, 2014)

“The Missile Crisis Fifty Years Later: What We Should Have Learned,” *Pensamiento Propio*, No. 34 (2011)


“The Implications of Political and Socio-Economic Changes in Latin America for U.S. Policy,” *Strategic Studies Institute*, U.S. Army War College (2013)

1. Introduction: Three Chronologies of the Cuban Missile Crisis
2. U.S. Perspective: 13 Days  Traditional Lessons
3. Soviet Perspective: 13 Months  Soviet Lessons
4. Cuban Perspective: 23 Months  Cuban Lessons
5. New Lessons

New Lessons from the Cuban Missile Crisis

On October 16, 1962 National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy informed President John F. Kennedy that the Soviet was constructing at least two bases for medium range ballistic missiles that could carry warheads 60 times more powerful than the Hiroshima bomb.

Intelligence analysts had discovered the bases as a result of a U-2 surveillance flight over Cuba on October 14. The CIA used this map to brief President Kennedy about the bases, which were not yet completed, showing the radius the missiles could cover. Its estimate of the missiles' range was slightly lower than their actual capability, which extended to New York City as well as Washington.



<http://www.cubanmissilecrisis.org/post/gallery/map-of-missile-range-in-cuba/>

New Lessons from the Cuban Missile Crisis

The President immediately called together a group of advisers he named the Executive Committee of the National Security Council, or ExComm. The ExComm included officials such as the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Treasury, and the Attorney General, and former officials such as Dean Acheson. They met in secret for the next six days, most often without the President.



Until recently most accounts credit the free-flowing deliberations of the ExComm with generating the strategy of deploying a blockade (quarantine) around Cuba in order to block the Soviet Union from bringing the missile warheads and additional military equipment to the island. We now know that the Soviets actually had delivered the warheads already. In a 2012 book, *The Cuban Missile Crisis in American Memory: Myths versus Reality*, Sheldon Stern demonstrates that the President shaped the ExComm discussions to conform to the least confrontational military option in the hope of avoiding conflict.

ExComm Misconstrues Soviet Motives

The ExComm assessed that the Soviet had risked placing the missiles in Cuba because Premier Khrushchev came away from a 1961 summit meeting with President Kennedy believing the young U.S. leader was weak. ExComm members assumed that the Soviet leader wanted to use the missiles as a bargaining chip to have the United States end its support for West Berlin.



Nikita Khrushchev meets with John F. Kennedy in Vienna, June 1961



Construction of Berlin Wall,
August 1961

New Lessons from the Cuban Missile Crisis



"All the News That's Fit to Print"

The New York Times

VOL. CXXI - No. 34,228 NEW YORK, TUESDAY, OCTOBER 23, 1962 FIVE CENTS

LATE CITY EDITION

U. S. Weather Service Report: Partly cloudy, breezy, and today. Partly cloudy, breezy, and today. Partly cloudy, breezy, and today. Partly cloudy, breezy, and today.

U.S. IMPOSES ARMS BLOCKADE ON CUBA

ON FINDING OFFENSIVE-MISSILE SITES; KENNEDY READY FOR SOVIET SHOWDOWN

U. S. JUDGES GIVEN POWER TO REQUIRE VOTE FOR NEGROES

High Court Upholds Order Forcing the Registration of 54 in Alabama County

WASHINGTON, Oct. 22—The Supreme Court today ruled that Federal judges have the power to order state registrars to accept specific Negroes as voters in Alabama.

Alabama had challenged an order by Federal District Judge Frank M. Johnson Jr., requiring the registration of its nonwhite Negroes in Mobile County, Ala. The order was upheld by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

Today the Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the Court's order. And it did so in a way that indicated once again its usual of legislative with Southern states in the area of Negro rights.

The Court's ruling in Alabama was the first since the court's decision in 1961 that state laws must be struck down if they are found to be in violation of the Constitution.

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Chinese Open New Front; Use Tanks Against Indians

Nehru Warns of Peril to Independence—Reds Attack Near Burmese Border and Press Two Other Drives

NEW DELHI, Oct. 22—China's Communist leaders today opened a new front in their drive to bring the Chinese Communist revolution to the rest of the world, by attacking the Indian Government's independence.

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SHIPS MUST STOP AT BERLIN BORDER

Other Action Planned if Big Rockets Are Not Dismantled

BERLIN, Oct. 22—The Soviet Government today demanded that the United States stop its ships from sailing to West Berlin.

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ANNOUNCED HIS ACTION: President Kennedy speaking to the nation last night on radio and television. He told of news to keep offensive equipment away from Cuba.

U.S. Bids U.N. Bar China; Denounces Attack on India

UNITED NATIONS, N. Y., Oct. 22—Aid U. S. Government today in the General Assembly today that Communist China's "bald aggression" against India was now proof that it was a threat to the peace of the world.

The United States today demanded that the United Nations take action against Communist China's aggression against India.

Moscow Says U.S. Holds 'Armed Fist' Over Cuba

MOSCOW, Tuesday, Oct. 22—In a broadcast before President Kennedy's speech on the radio last night, the Moscow radio said that the United States was holding an "armed fist" over Cuba.

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BIG FORCE MASSES TO BLOCKADE CUBA

A Soviet reply to the United States today on Cuba, that was given by the Soviet Government.

The Soviet Government today announced that it was massing a large force of troops and ships to blockade Cuba.

PRESIDENT GRAVE Asserts Russians Lied and Put Hemisphere in Great Danger

President Kennedy today asserted that the Soviet Union had lied about its intentions in Cuba and that the world was in a state of grave danger.

President Kennedy today asserted that the Soviet Union had lied about its intentions in Cuba and that the world was in a state of grave danger.

President Kennedy addressed the nation on October 22, 1962 to announce the United States had discovered ballistic missiles and that he was ordering a "quarantine" around Cuba.

New Lessons from the Cuban Missile Crisis

This is an excerpt from the letter Premier Khrushchev sent to President Kennedy on October 26, 1962, in which the Soviet leader proposed to remove the missiles from Cuba if the United States pledged not to invade Cuba.

The letter arrived late in the evening, and the ExComm decided to examine the proposal early the next morning.

That evening the Soviet KGB station chief in Washington, DC asked ABC White House correspondent John Scali to convey essentially the same proposal to President Kennedy.

Mr. President, I appeal to you to weigh well what the aggressive, piratical actions, which you have declared the USA intends to carry out in international waters, would lead to. You yourself know that any sensible man simply cannot agree with this, cannot recognize your right to such actions.

If you did this as the first step towards the unleashing of war, well then, it is evident that nothing else is left to us but to accept this challenge of yours. If, however, you have not lost your self-control and sensibly conceive what this might lead to, then, Mr. President, we and you ought not now to pull on the ends of the rope in which you have tied the knot of war, because the more the two of us pull, the tighter that knot will be tied. And a moment may come when that knot will be tied so tight that even he who tied it will not have the strength to untie it, and then it will be necessary to cut that knot. And what that would mean is not for me to explain to you, because you yourself understand perfectly of what terrible forces our countries dispose.

Consequently, if there is no intention to tighten that knot and thereby to doom the world to the catastrophe of thermonuclear war, then let us not only relax the forces pulling on the ends of the rope, let us take measures to untie that knot. We are ready for this.

See image of page 240

<http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v11/d84#fn2>

As the ExComm met on the morning of October 27, Premier Khrushchev broadcast a new letter on Radio Moscow. This letter changed the first proposal significantly, by demanding the U.S. remove its ballistic missiles from Turkey (which bordered the Soviet border at the time). Turkey was a NATO ally, and President Kennedy feared that the alliance would be damaged if he withdrew the Turkish missiles in response to a Soviet ultimatum.

178 Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, Volume VI

66. Letter From Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy

Moscow, October 27, 1962.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT, I have studied with great satisfaction your reply to Mr. Thant concerning measures that should be taken to avoid contact between our vessels and thereby avoid irreparable and fatal consequences.¹ This reasonable step on your part strengthens my belief that you are showing concern for the preservation of peace, which I note with satisfaction.

You are disturbed over Cuba. You say that this disturbs you because it is 90 miles by sea from the coast of the United States of America. But Turkey adjoins us; our sentries patrol back and forth and see each other.

I therefore make this proposal: We are willing to remove from Cuba the means which you regard as offensive. We are willing to carry this out and to make this pledge in the United Nations. Your representatives will make a declaration to the effect that the United States, for its part, considering the uneasiness and anxiety of the Soviet State, will remove its analogous means from Turkey.

We, in making this pledge, in order to give satisfaction and hope of the peoples of Cuba and Turkey and to strengthen their confidences in their security, will make a statement within the framework of the Security Council to the effect that the Soviet Government gives a solemn promise to respect the inviolability of the borders and sovereignty of Turkey, not to interfere in its internal affairs, not to invade Turkey, not to make available our territory as a bridgehead for such an invasion, and that it would also restrain those who contemplate committing aggression against Turkey, either from the territory of the Soviet Union or from the territory of Turkey's other neighboring states.

The United States Government will make a similar statement within the framework of the Security Council regarding Cuba. It will declare that the United States will respect the inviolability of Cuba's borders and its sovereignty, will pledge not to interfere in its internal affairs, not to invade Cuba itself or make its territory available as a bridgehead for such an invasion, and will also restrain those who might contemplate committing aggression against Cuba, either from the territory of the United States or from the territory of Cuba's other neighboring states.

http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v06/pg_178

Black Saturday

Early in the afternoon on October 27, the ExComm learned that a U-2 flying at 70,000 feet had been shot down by a Soviet missile, and the pilot was killed. U-2s had been flying over Cuba three or four times each day since October 16 without incident. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that the President commence an attack on Cuba immediately. Everyone believed the day would end with the start of a major war. Robert McNamara said to George Ball that he thought neither would ever see another Spring.



U.S. Estimates of Forces in Cuba

- 7,000 – 10,000 Soviet troops
- 100,000 armed Cubans
- No nuclear warheads

Reality of forces in Cuba

- 42,000 Soviet military personnel
- 400,000 armed Cubans
- 168 nuclear warheads for ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and tactical nuclear missiles

- ❑ **Crises can be managed**
 - **Secrecy**
 - **Small group with open discussion**
 - **Exclude and misinform Congress and public**
- ❑ **Steel Will (“Eyeball to Eyeball”)**
 - **Toughness**
 - **Resolve**
- ❑ **Superior Strength**
 - **Build up Military**
 - **Exercise Coercive Diplomacy**

Soviet Perspective: Caribbean Crisis (October 1961 – November 1962)



U.S.S. Joseph P. Kennedy stops and inspects the *Marucla*, a dry-cargo ship

1: Strategic Imbalance

Sergei Khrushchev (son of Premier Nikita Khrushchev): “Now with regard to the question of parity. Mr. [Robert] McNamara very correctly said that with regard to nuclear warheads, the ratio was 17-1....It actually tormented our leadership a great deal. Because we were actually subject to a possible strike of American missile forces, and aviation forces, and we had nothing with which to respond.”

Soviet General Dimitri Volkogonov: “I think we have not fully clarified the motives behind all these actions. An allegory might be used here. St. John the Divine said that God has seven cups of anger which he could pour out onto the earth. So, applying this analogy to us, we could say that the Soviet side had at that time only half-a-cup. The Americans had seven cups. Therefore if we placed our missiles in Cuba, then we would have a full cup.”

Statements made at Symposium on the Caribbean Crisis, reprinted in Bruce J. Allyn, James G. Blight, and David A. Welch, eds., *Back to the Brink: Proceedings of the Moscow Conference on the Cuban Missile Crisis, January 27-28, 1989*, CSIA Occasional Paper No.9 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Center for Science and International Affairs, 1992), pp. 37 and 53.



New Lessons from the Cuban Missile Crisis

During the 1960 presidential election campaign, Senator John Kennedy attacked the Eisenhower Administration for allowing the United States to fall behind the Soviet Union militarily, creating a “missile gap.”

On October 21, 1961, Deputy Secretary of

Defense Roswell Gilpatric revealed that, in fact, the U.S. was ahead of the U.S.S.R.

He also announced the U.S. would increase its military budget by 15% for the next fiscal year. Soviet analysts saw his speech as a threat, and evidence of U.S. preparations for a first strike against the Soviet Union.



HOLD FOR RELEASE
UNTIL 6:30 P.M. (EDT)
SATURDAY, OCTOBER 21, 1961

NO 1173-61

Oxford 53201-53176

ADDRESS BY
ROSWELL L. GILPATRIC, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
BEFORE THE BUSINESS COUNCIL
AT THE HOMESTEAD, HOT SPRINGS, VIRGINIA
SATURDAY, OCTOBER 21, 1961 - 9:00 P.M. (EST) - 10:00 P.M. (EDT)

The fact is that this nation has a nuclear retaliatory force of such lethal power that an enemy move which brought it into play would be an act of self-destruction on his part. The U. S. has today hundreds of manned intercontinental bombers capable of reaching the Soviet Union, including 600 heavy bombers and many more medium bombers equally capable of intercontinental operations because of our highly developed in-flight refueling techniques and world-wide base structure. The U. S. also has 6 POLARIS submarines at sea carrying a total of 96 missiles, and dozens of intercontinental ballistic missiles. Our carrier strike forces and land-based theater forces could deliver additional hundreds of megatons. The total number of our nuclear delivery vehicles, tactical as well as strategic, is in the tens of thousands; and of course, we have more than one warhead for each vehicle.

<http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB56/BerlinC6.pdf>

New Lessons from the Cuban Missile Crisis

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 30 —
Following is the text of a White House statement on the Soviet Union's explosion of a large nuclear device:

About 3:30 this morning, the Soviet Union detonated a very large nuclear device. Preliminary evidence indicates that its magnitude is on the order of fifty megatons. The explosion took place in the atmosphere. It will produce more radioactive fallout than any previous explosion.

The Soviet explosion was a political rather than a military act. The device exploded does not add in effectiveness against military targets to nuclear weapons now available both to the Soviet Union and the United States.

It does not affect the basic balance of nuclear power. Any such weapon would be primarily a mass killer of people in war—and the testing of this device primarily an incitement to fright and panic in the cold war.

In undertaking this test, the Soviet Union has deliberately overridden the expressed hope of the world as stated in the resolution adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on Oct. 28.

The Soviet Union responded to Gilpatric's speech by exploding a 50-megaton hydrogen bomb in the atmosphere on October 30, 1961



2: Defense of Cuba

Nikita Khrushchev: “I was haunted by the knowledge that the Americans could not stomach having Castro’s Cuba right next to them. They would do something....Our aim was to strengthen and to reinforce Cuba.” – Jerrold L. Schecter, ed., *Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes* (Boston: Little Brown, 1990), p. 170.

The Non-Aligned Movement was organized in 1961 by India, Indonesia, Egypt, and Yugoslavia to represent the Third World in East-West conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. Of the 25 original members, Cuba was the only one from the Western Hemisphere.

At the time, the Soviet Union and China both claimed to be the “natural leader” of the Third World.

The Soviet claim would have been eviscerated if it allowed the United States to overthrow the Cuban government by invading Cuba, because as a founding member of the NAM, Cuba was viewed a Third World leader.




Operation Mongoose (Cuba Project)


Authorized by President John F. Kennedy on November 30, 1961, Operation Mongoose was the largest CIA covert operation carried out until that time. The Plan had four components:

- **Terrorism:** Raids by Mongoose operatives based in Florida included burning factories and fields, killing teachers, sabotaging equipment and electric lines, supplying counter-revolutionaries.
- **Political isolation:** In January, 1962, the United States succeeded in suspending Cuba's OAS membership.
- **Economic strangulation:** In February, 1962, the United States imposed a total economic embargo on Cuba that included food and medicine. The embargo remains in effect today.
- **Military intimidation:** The United States held unusually large military exercises in the Caribbean, the most provocative of which involved the mock invasion of Vieques Island. The name of the island in the war game was "Ortsac," which is "Castro" spelled backwards.

At the same time, in a separate project, the CIA was trying to assassinate Fidel Castro with the aid of the Mafia.



In July 1962 the Soviet Union began to send ballistic missiles, other weapons and soldiers to Cuba. The build-up troubled US military planners, even as they concluded that the Soviets were not installing ballistic missiles. Soldiers were told that they were going on a mission near Vladivostok, and their destination was revealed to them only after they left port.



Soviet soldiers dressed themselves in recreational garb in order to appear to U.S. analysts that they were not on a military mission.

New Lessons from the Cuban Missile Crisis

Havana, 26 October 1962

Dear Compañero Khrushchev:

From an analysis of the situation and the reports that we have at our disposal, I believe that the aggression is almost imminent within the next 24 to 72 hours.

There are two possible alternatives: the first and most likely is an attack against specific targets with the limited objective of destroying them and the second, less likely but possible, is an invasion. I understand that carrying out this alternative requires a large force and is also the most repulsive form of aggression, which might inhibit them.

You can be sure that we will firmly and resolutely resist an attack whatever it may be. The morale of the Cuban people is extremely high and they will confront the aggressor heroically.

I would like now to express my opinion in a very few words. If the second alternative takes place and the imperialists invade Cuba to occupy it, the danger that such an aggressive policy holds for humanity is so great that after that action the Soviet Union should not ever allow circumstance to arise in which the imperialists could unleash a first-strike nuclear attack.

I tell you this because I believe that the aggressiveness of the imperialists is becoming extremely dangerous and if they decide to carry out something so brutally in violation of law and universal morality as to invade Cuba, that would be the moment to eliminate such a danger forever by the most legitimate defense no matter how severe and terrible the solution, because there is no other.

I am influenced in this opinion by seeing how this aggressive policy is developing as the imperialists, in spite of world opinion, and disregarding principles of law, blockade the seas, violate our air space, prepare for invasion, while at the same time allow every possibility for negotiations to fail, despite understanding the gravity of the problem.

You have been and are a tireless defender of peace; I understand how bitter these hours must have been when the results of your superhuman efforts are menaced so seriously.

Nevertheless, until the last moment, we will continue in the hope that peace may be saved, and we are ready to contribute with what is at our disposal. But at the same time, we are serenely ready to confront a situation that we see as very real and very near.

I express once again the infinite gratitude and the recognition of our people to the Soviet people who so generously and fraternally have been with us, and our deepest gratitude and admiration to you, as well as a desire for success in the enormous task and grave responsibilities you have on your hands.

Fraternaly,
Fidel Castro

Early in the morning of October 26, Cuban leader Fidel Castro sent a letter to Premier Khrushchev warning him that the United States was likely to attack Cuba within the next 72 hours. He assumed that U.S. analysts knew the nuclear warheads were already on the island, and he recommended that the Soviets should launch a nuclear attack first if the U.S. opted for an invasion in addition to air attacks.

<http://www.walterlippmann.com/fc-10-26-1962.html>

❑ Crises cannot be managed

- Humans are fallible and are likely to make mistakes
- Orders are likely to be disobeyed in the heat of a confrontation

❑ Therefore, crises must be prevented

- Improve communications with the other superpower (such as with the “hot line” that the Soviets proposed after the crisis)
- Achieve parity (equal military force) with the United States, so that U.S. temptations to be aggressive will be moderated (the Soviets began a massive military build-up after the missile crisis, and achieved parity in the early 1970s)

Cuban Perspective: October Crisis (January 1961 – November 1962)



Cuban anti-aircraft gunners fire at low-level reconnaissance planes on October 27, 1962.

"All the News
That's Fit to Print"

The New York Times.

LATE CITY EDITION

U. S. Weather Bureau Report (Page 64) forecast:
Mostly fair, seasonably cold today
and tonight, Fair, warmer tomorrow.
Temp. range 38—25; yesterday: 33—31.

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except on long issues). Higher in air delivery cities.

FIVE CENTS

U. S. BREAKS ITS DIPLOMATIC TIES WITH CUBA AND ADVISES AMERICANS TO LEAVE ISLAND; EISENHOWER CITES 'VILIFICATION' BY CASTRO



President Dwight D. Eisenhower

On January 3, 1961, 17 days before leaving office, President Eisenhower announced that the United States was breaking diplomatic relations with Cuba. Cuban leaders interpreted the action as a prelude to a U.S. attack.



Anticipating that President Kennedy's October 22, 1962 speech would be about Cuba, Prime Minister Fidel Castro ordered the main newspaper to publish a special edition announcing: "COMBAT ALARM: THE NATION IS ON A WAR FOOTING: So Orders Prime Minister Fidel Castro in the face of the danger of aggression posed by Kennedy".

- Cessation of the U.S. economic embargo and U.S. pressure on other countries to curtail their trade with Cuba
- End U.S. subversive activities against Cuba, including the “organization of invasions by mercenaries” and “infiltration of spies and saboteurs”
- Cease “piratical attacks” from bases in the United States and Puerto Rico
- End violations of Cuban airspace
- United States must withdraw from Guantanamo Naval Base

New Lessons from the Cuban Missile Crisis

Beginning on November 4, 1962, Soviet Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan attempted to convince the Cuban leaders that the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement served Cuba's interest, that they should permit international inspection of the missile sites being dismantled, and that the Soviet Union would reject new U.S. demands that Cuba relinquish IL-28 bombers and Komar patrol boats already sent to Cuba.

Meanwhile U.S. strategic forces remained at Def-Con 2, the highest state of alert prior to nuclear war. President Kennedy ended the alert on November 20, 1962, when Cuba accepted the *fait accompli* that the Soviets would be taking back the bombers and patrol boats.



Top: Sitting on the left, Raul Castro, Fidel Castro, Osvaldo Dorticos, Raul Roa, and Carlos Rafael Rodriguez meet with Alexandr Aleexev, Anastas Mikoyan and translator.

Bottom: Fidel Castro (right) greets Anastas Mikoyan.

❑ **Neither superpower can be trusted**

- Following the death of Soviet Premier Khrushchev, a four-year period of tension between Cuba and the Soviet Union nearly leads to a break
- The U.S. resumes support for terrorists, and continues attempts to assassinate the Cuban leadership until 1966

❑ **Cuba must defend itself with asymmetric warfare**

- Cuba commits itself to exporting revolution in the Third World, and in 1966 it creates the Organization in Solidarity with the Peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America
- Che Guevara calls for “one, two, many Vietnams” as a way of dividing the capacity of the United States to suppress revolutionary movements

❑ **Intensify internal security**

- To defend itself against subversion from the United States, Cuba initiates a campaign against internal dissent and deviation from official orthodoxy
- As a result, the worst period of human rights violations occurs in the 1960s

United States

- Crises can be managed: In fact the missile crisis ended peacefully because of luck
 - U.S. policy makers were unaware that Soviet nuclear warheads had reached the island
- Steel will and inflexibility are essential: In fact Kennedy was flexible and accommodating
 - U.S. secretly agreed to remove the missiles from Turkey
- Threat of force led the Soviets to back down: In fact the Soviets did not fear losing a war
 - Fear of a nuclear armagedon led Kennedy and Khrushchev to back down from the brink

Soviet Union

- Build-up its military: In fact, Soviet military spending fed an arms race that weakened it
 - The Soviets did not understand that the increase in U.S. military spending was intended mainly to stimulate the U.S. economy, not to threaten the Soviet Union

Cuba

- The U.S. will attempt an invasion again: In fact, the U.S. ceased planning for an invasion
 - Cuban pre-occupation with a U.S. threat led it to create a national security state that suppressed the vitality of the Cuban Revolution

- ❑ Neither Force nor the Threat of Force is Likely to End a Crisis Peacefully, and Similarly,
 - The Use of Force or the Threat of Force is Likely to Engender or Exacerbate a Crisis

- ❑ Crises Cannot Be Managed, and
 - Therefore Crises Must Be Prevented

- ❑ To Prevent Crises,
 - All Parties Must Avoid Exacerbating the Fears of their Adversaries and Must Acknowledge their Adversaries Legitimate Grievances by Practicing Empathy

Final slide.

Thank you